In this paper, we propose a revocable and decentralized attribute-based encryption (ABE) system that splits the task of decryption key generation across multiple attribute authorities (AAs) without requiring any central party such that it achieves attribute revocation by simply stopping updating of the corresponding private key. In our system, a party can easily behave as an AA by creating a public and private key pair without any global communication except the creation for the common system parameters, under which it can periodically issue/update private key components for users that reflect their attributes, and an AA can freely leave the system once its corresponding attribute is revoked without communication with other AAs. In addition, to revoke a user, those AAs that have issued private keys to this user easily cease the key updating process for the user without affecting other AAs' execution. For the construction of our system, the technical barrier is to make private keys collusion resistant. Since in our system each component of a user's private key at a time period may come from different AAs and there is no coordination between these AAs, traditional technique of binding together different components (issued by different AAs) of a private key by randomization cannot be employed. To overcome this, we tie the key components together and prevent collusion attacks between different users by embedding distinct identifiers and a commonly shared time attribute in these components.
INTRODUCTION
Public-key encryption can be viewed as a method for a user to share data to a targeted user or device while protecting the confidentiality of the transmitted information from other curious users. This is useful in scenarios where the data provider knows exactly which user it wants to share data with, but this is not realistic in applications where people are identified by their attributes, and the data provider wants to convey data according to some policy based on the privileged user's attributes. Sahai and Waters [1] proposed the notion of attribute-based encryption (ABE) to solve the above problem, where each user is issued an attribute-based private key from an attribute authority (AA) or key generation authority that reflects their attributes, and a data provider can specify access policies to the data over a set of attributes. A user will be able to decrypt a ciphertext if the attributes under its private key satisfy the access policy associated with the ciphertext. One drawback of the original Sahai-Waters approach is that every user must prove its ownership of a set of attributes to a trusted party to obtain the corresponding attribute-based private key for decryption, which implies the existence of a single trusted party who monitors attributes and issues private keys for all users. To overcome this limitation, the concept of multi-authority ABE [2, 3] was introduced, where multiple AAs operate simultaneously, and each distributes private key components corresponding to different sets of attributes. Since a trusted central authority (CA) is still required in the multi-authority ABE schemes in [2, 3] , decentralized multi-authority ABE [4] [5] [6] was proposed to avert the single security bottleneck incurred by counting on a central AA.
The appearance of ABE affirmatively solves the problem arising in the situations where different users with different attributes are given access to different levels of the encrypted data, but it fails to address the problem that the attributes of a user may change with time. This problem initiated the study of revocation [7] where a periodic key update would only Advance Access publication on 12 February 2016 SECTION A: COMPUTER SCIENCE THEORY, METHODS AND TOOLS THE COMPUTER JOURNAL, VOL. 59 NO. 8, 2016
allow non-revoked users to update their keys to decrypt the newly encrypted data. Considering the ABE setting, there are two main ways to realize revocability: (i) indirect revocation [7, 8] where a sender encrypts with an attribute set and a time attribute, and the AA, with the current revocation list, periodically provides key update information at each time period so that only the non-revoked users can update their keys and thus decrypt the ciphertexts encrypted at the current time period;
(ii) direct revocation [8, 9] where a sender specifies the revocation list directly when running the encrypting algorithm (i.e. the sender is required to possess the current revocation list), such that the revocation can be done instantly and does not require the key update phase as in the indirect method. Even though direct revocation can be done immediately without the key update process which asks for the communication from the AA to all the non-revoked users over all the time periods, it requires all the data providers to keep the current revocation list, which makes the system be impurely attribute-based, since data providers in the attribute-based setting create ciphertext based only on attributes without caring revocation. On the contrary, indirect revocation does not require the data providers to own the revocation list, but its key update phase is a bottleneck since it requires communication from the AA to all the unrevoked users at all the time periods. In this paper, we focus on the design of efficaciously and indirectly revocable ABE schemes.
Motivated by the fact that decentralization essentially reduces the trust on a central AA, we consider making use of it to alleviate both communication cost and security bottleneck in the single AA setting. That is, we would like the task of a single AA to be split across multiple AAs to reduce the computation overhead. We accomplish this by putting forward a notion of revocable and decentralized ABE with the goal of efficiently achieving revocability in the decentralized ABE systems.
Our contributions
Based on the scheme given in [6] , we present a decentralized ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) system supporting indirect revocation, which can be regarded as a CP-ABE scheme with two properties: (i) decentralization-any party can become an AA without the requirement of any global coordination except the initialization of the common reference parameters created during the setup phase and (ii) revocability-the AAs periodically update components of attribute-based private keys such that only the non-revoked users can obtain their private keys to decrypt the newly encrypted data in the current time period. Thanks to the decentralization property, in our system, revocation of an attribute, i.e. completely removing an attribute from the system, can be done by simply stopping issuing key update by the corresponding AA. In addition, when an attribute of a user is revoked, the corresponding AA can simply stop updating for this user with no influence on the update for this user from other AAs. In our inial construction, each AA needs to issue each user a new private key at different time slots, which is convenient to be applied in the practice, and we found this methodology under the decentralizing setting can reduce a single AA's workload. However, it would be desirable to reduce the key update size of each AA from linear to logarithmic as in [7] . Therefore, using the binary tree structure [7, 8] , we extend our original construction to a new scheme in which the amount of work each AA has to do for key updates is mitigated and the total size of key updates is reduced to logarithmic in the number of users.
In a revocable and decentralized CP-ABE scheme, a party can simply behave as an AA by creating a public and private key pair, with which it can extract and periodically update components of attribute-based private keys for different users. When the attribute of an AA is revoked, this AA can freely terminates its role as an AA by being inactive. Since different AAs operate entirely independently, the failure or corruption of some AAs will not affect the functionality of the uncorrupted AAs. In our system, the concept of global identifier [2, 6] is subtly applied to link together the private key components issued to the same user by multiple AAs, such that any data provider can encrypt data in terms of any time period and any access policy over the attributes issued from any set of AAs.
Our security model for the proposed scheme takes into account all the adversarial capabilities in the standard ABE security notion. First, the adversary should be able to learn the private keys associated with the attribute sets of its choice. Secondly, the adversary should not be able to learn any information about the message encrypted for the challenge set of attributes. In addition, we assume that the adversary is given access to the periodical key updates, which asks the adversary to be unable to learn any information about the message encrypted for any users with attributes containing the time period past the revocation time, i.e. the ciphertext is created after the time of revocation.
Challenges and solutions. Regarding the construction of a revocable and decentralized ABE system, the key challenge is to make it secure against collusion attacks.
Traditionally, to achieve collusion resistance in ABE, the single AA combines different components (corresponding to different attributes) of a user's private key together by randomizing the key. Such randomization makes different key elements for one user compatible with each other, but not work with the components of a key belonging to another user. However, this technique of key randomization does not work in the setting of decentralization, because there is no central party to tie all the pieces together, and each part of a key may come from different AAs who have no coordination and are possibly not aware the existence of each other. To shun this obstacle, we resort to the approach of tying a user's key components together and preventing collusion attacks between different users with different global identities [6] . At a high level, this method, instead of relying on one key generation to bind all the key components together, uses a hash function on the user's global identity GID to preserve collusion resistance across multiple key generations from different AAs. On the other hand, when encrypting a message, in our system, a data provider, besides the usual attribute set input A, is also required to specify the current time period Time. In this case, in order to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted for a set of attributes A and a time period Time, a user must possess the key components for all i ∈ A under Time from different AAs which periodically update key components at the start of each time period. Since the time attribute is the same for all users, in case of compromising the security, it is imperative to prevent collusion attacks. This requires that revoked users cannot combine their keys with the update information for the non-revoked users to decrypt a newly created ciphertext which they are not able to decrypt with their old keys. To achieve this, our approach is to bind the time period and the global identifier together during key generation while keeping the global identifier away during the encryption (i.e. the system is still attribute-based).
Our system is proved secure using the recent dual system encryption methodology [10] , where the security proof works by first converting the challenge ciphertexts and private keys to a semi-functional form and then arguing the security. Following the variant of the dual system proof technique in [11] , we build our scheme using the bilinear groups of composite order on the basis of the decentralization ABE scheme in [6] .
Related work
After Sahai and Waters [1] introduced the notion of ABE, Goyal et al. formulated two complimentary forms of ABE [12] , CP-ABE [13] and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [12] . In a CP-ABE system, the keys are associated with the sets of the attributes and the ciphertexts are associated with the access policies, while in a KP-ABE system, the situation is reversed that the keys are associated with the access policies and the ciphertexts are associated with the sets of the attributes. Since then, various kinds of ABE systems have been proposed [2, 4-6, 8-10, 12, 14-19] , including multi-authority ABE [2, [4] [5] [6] , ABE with full security [10, 17] , revocable ABE [7] [8] [9] 18] etc.
Multi-authority ABE was proposed by Chase [2] to construct an ABE scheme where the decryption key is created by different AAs. However, the solution presented in [2] need the presence of a single trusted 'CA' to issue each AA a unique key. Chase and Chow [4] tried to remove the CA using a distributed PRF, but the scheme in [4] is achieved under an AND policy and a determined set of AAs. Lin et al. [5] gave a threshold-based scheme that is somewhat decentralized, but the set of AAs is fixed ahead of time, and the system is only secure up to collusion of m users. Lewko and Waters [6] presented the first fully decentralized CP-ABE scheme, where any party can become an AA (i.e. the system does not require any CA), and there is no requirement for any global coordination other than the generation of an initial set of common reference parameters.
Boldyreva et al. [7] proposed a revocable KP-ABE scheme using an approach of indirect revocation where the AA indirectly enables the revocation by forcing revoked users to be unable to update their keys. In order to eliminate the impedient key update phase in the indirect revocation, Attrapadung and Imai [9] put forth an ABE system with direct revocation, which allows the senders to specify the revocation list directly when encrypting by requiring the senders to keep the current revocation list. Also, Attrapadung and Imai [8] raised a hybrid revocable KP-ABE system under selective security model which allows a sender to select whether to use either direct or indirect revocation mode when encrypting a message. Sahai et al. [18] provided the first revocable ABE scheme in a generic way that deals with the problem of efficiently revoking stored data, where the database can periodically update the ciphertexts using only publicly available information stored on the system.
Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the definitions associated with this work. In Section 3, after the description of the system framework, we elaborate the security model of revocable and decentralized CP-ABE. In Section 4, we present a specific construction of revocable and decentralized CP-ABE, and analyze its security. In Section 5, we compare our construction with some prior revocable ABE schemes, and then extend our revocable and decentralized ABE system to improve its efficiency. We conclude this paper in Section 6.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some basic cryptographic conceptions and definitions that are related to this work.
Access structures and linear secret sharing
We review the notions of access structures and linear secret sharing schemes in [6, 16] In this paper, attributes will play the role of the parties and only the monotone access structures will be considered. Observe that more general access structures [6] It is shown in [6, 16] that every linear secret sharing scheme consistent with the above definition meets the following linear reconstruction property. Suppose that is an LSSS for an access structure A. Let S ∈ A be an authorized set, and define I ⊆ {1, . . . , l} as I = {x | ρ(x) ∈ S}. Then the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) is in the span of the rows of matrix A indexed by I, and there exist constants {w x ∈ Z p } such that if {λ x } are valid shares of a secret s according to , then x∈I w x λ x = s. According to [6, 16] , these constants {w x } can be found in polynomial time in terms of the size of share-generating matrix A.
For the construction under composite order group, the LSSS matrices can be considered over Z N , where N = p 1 p 2 p 3 is a product of three distinct primes. A set S is authorized if the rows of matrix A labeled by elements in S have the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) in their span modulo N. Regarding the security proof, it will be further assumed that for an unauthorized set, the corresponding rows of matrix A do not have the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) in their span modulo the individual prime factors of N. This is because if an adversary can produce a matrix A over Z N and an unauthorized set over Z N that is authorized over Z p i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then this can be used to produce a non-trivial factor of the group order N, which contradicts with the complexity assumptions.
Boolean formulas [6] . Access policies can also be described in terms of monotonic boolean formulas. LSSS access structures are more general, and can be derived from representations as boolean formulas. There are standard techniques to convert any monotonic boolean formula into a corresponding LSSS matrix. The boolean formula can be represented as an access tree, where the interior nodes are AND and OR gates, and the leaf nodes correspond to attributes. The number of rows in the corresponding LSSS matrix will be same as the number of leaf nodes in the access tree.
Composite-order bilinear groups and complexity assumptions
Let G be a group generator algorithm which takes a security parameter λ as the input and outputs (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , G, G T ,ê), where p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are distinct primes, G and G T are cyclic groups of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , andê : G × G → G T is a map with the following properties [20] :
Assume that the group operations in G and G T as well as the bilinear mapê are computable in polynomial time with respect to λ and that the group descriptions of G and G T include the generators of the respective cyclic groups. Let G p 1 , G p 2 and G p 3 be the subgroups of order p 1 , p 2 and p 3 in G, respectively. It is observed in [6] 
is the identity element in G T . This orthogonality property of G p 1 , G p 2 , G p 3 will be used to implement the semi-functionality in the constructions.
Let G p 1 p 2 denote the subgroup of order p 1 p 2 in G. Let g 1 ← G p 1 denote that g 1 is chosen to be a random generator of G p 1 (so it is not the identity element), and T 1 ← G denote that T 1 is chosen to be a random generator of G (this is not quite the same as a uniformly random element, but the distributions are negligibly close).
Given a group generator G, the assumptions used in this paper are defined in Fig. 1 . The advantage of algorithm A in breaking Assumption i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is defined to be
We say that G satisfies Assumption i if Adv
is a negligible function of the security parameter λ for any polynomial time algorithm A.
Note that in Assumption 1, T 1 can be written (uniquely) as the product of an element of G p 1 , an element of G p 2 and an element of G p 3 . In this paper, these elements will be referred to as the 'G p 1 part of T 1 ', the 'G p 2 part of T 1 ' and the 'G p 3 part of T 1 ', respectively ( Fig. 1 ).
FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we present the formal definition of revocable and decentralized ABE, after depicting the architecture of our ABE system. Assumptions Distributions for 
Framework
A revocable and decentralized CP-ABE system is comprised of the following algorithms: global setup algorithm GSetup, AA setup algorithm ASetup, attribute-based private key generation & update algorithm KeyGen & KeyUpdate, encryption algorithm Encrypt and decryption algorithm Decrypt. Assume that the attribute-based private keys of the non-revoked users will be renewed periodically (e.g. every month), and the senders encrypt using the receivers' attributes and the current time period, e.g. 'June of 2015'. Also, there exists a revocation list for each attribute in the system, which stores the identities of all the revoked users associated with the attribute, and is held by the corresponding AA.
(i) GSetup(1 λ ) → GP. Taking the security parameter λ as the input, this global setup algorithm outputs the global parameter GP for the system. (ii) ASetup(GP) → (apk, ask). Taking the global parameter GP as the input, each AA creates its own master public and private key pair (apk, ask).
Taking the global parameter GP, a time period Time, a revocation list rl i , an identity GID, an attribute i belonging to some AA and a master private key ask for this AA as the input, this key generation and update algorithm produces the update key sk Time i,GID for this attribute, identity and time tuple. We require that a revocable and decentralized CP-ABE system is correct, meaning that if GP is generated from the global setup algorithm, C is generated from the encryption algorithm on a message M and a time period Time, and {sk Time i,GID } is a set of private keys obtained from the key generation algorithm for the same identity GID at the time period Time over a set of attributes satisfying the access structure of the ciphertext, then Decrypt(GP, C, {sk Time i,GID }) = M .
Security definition
Assuming that the adversary corrupts the AAs statically [2, 4, 6] and make the key generation & update queries adaptively, we define the security for revocable and decentralized CP-ABE encryption systems by the following game between a challenger algorithm C and an adversary algorithm A. Let S be the set of all the AAs, and U be the universe of attributes. Suppose that each AA can control multiple attributes, but each attribute is assigned to only one AA. To match the practice, it can be considered as an attribute being the concatenation of an AA's public key and an attribute string, such that if multiple AAs choose the same attribute, these will still correspond to distinct attributes in the system.
(i) Setup. Algorithm C runs the global setup algorithm.
Algorithm A defines a set of S ⊆ S of corrupt AAs. For these non-compromised AAs S − S , algorithm C obtains the public and private key pairs by running the AA setup algorithm, and gives the public keys to algorithm A. Remarks. Note that our security definition is a little different from that presented in [8, 18] . First, the definition in [8] considers selective security, where the adversary is required to specify the target time period and attribute set before having access to the public parameter, while ours focuses on full security without such limitation. Secondly, the definition in [18] puts the time in a sequential order, which requires that the adversary, after seeing the target time period, is not allowed to issue key update queries for time period equal to or greater than the target one when the adversary makes private key queries with sufficient attributes to decrypt the target ciphertext, whereas in our model the time period is out of order, and thus the adversary is restricted to make key generation & update queries for time period equal to the target one under the same condition.
A REVOCABLE AND ONE-USE MULTI-AUTHORITY CP-ABE SYSTEM
In this section, we describe a revocable and one-use multiauthority CP-ABE scheme, and then prove its security in the random oracle model using the dual system encryption technique [10] .
Construction
The one-use decentralized ABE with revocability system is composed of the following algorithms, of which some are the same as that in [6] .
(i) GSetup. The system chooses a composite order bilinear group G of which the group order is a product of three primes as 
The attribute-based private key for user GID at time period Time is {sk
x of access matrix A. It is required that the row labeling ρ of an access matrix to be injective, i.e. each attribute is used at most once. To encrypt a message M under an n × l access matrix A with ρ mapping the rows to the attributes, the data provider randomly chooses s ∈ Z N , − → v ∈ Z l N with s as its first entry, respectively, − → w ∈ Z l N with 0 as its first entry, r x ∈ Z N for each row A x of A, and computes
The data provider outputs the ciphertext C = (C 0 , such x, the receiver computes
The receiver then chooses c x ∈ Z N such that
x c x A x = (1, 0, . . . , 0), and computes
where
Multi-use multi-authority CP-ABE. The construction we presented will be proved secure under the restriction that attributes are used only once. It has been showed in [6] how to construct a secure multi-use multi-authority CP-ABE system where attributes can be used multiple times in an access matrix from a secure multi-authority CP-ABE scheme where attributes are used only once with a simple encoding technique. Since our revocable and decentralized CP-ABE scheme is built upon the scheme in [6] , this encoding approach can be applied to our construction as well.
Removing secure channels. In our system, each available AA (whose attribute has not been revoked) needs to update users' private keys at a regular basis. This means that all the users have to regularly contact each AA, prove their attributes and get new private keys, which implies that all the available AAs must be online for all such communications, and a secure channel must be established between each AA and each user to transmit the private key. This becomes extremely annoying for a very large number of users. In order to avoid the need for frequent interaction and a secure channel, we can ask each AA to encrypt the new keys of non-revoked users under their global identities and the previous time period [7] , and forward the ciphertexts to these users. With this approach, for every non-revoked user, each AA is required to perform one key generation and one encryption per key update.
Security
In order to reduce the security of our revocable and decentralized attribute-based encryption system, the dual system encryption technique [10] is applied, in which the keys and the ciphertexts are divided as normal and semi-functional: the normal keys can decrypt the semi-functional ciphertexts, the semi-functional keys can decrypt the normal ciphertexts, but the semi-functional keys cannot decrypt the semi-functional ciphertexts. The proof is proceeded over a sequence of games, where firstly the challenge ciphertext is changed to be semifunctional, and then the keys are changed to be semi-functional one by one. These games are indistinguishable from each other, which can be proved from the fact that the simulator itself cannot tell the form of the key being turned from normal to semi-functional by decrypting a semi-functional ciphertext.
Since the construction of our system is very similar to that in [6] , we begin with the definitions of the semi-functional ciphertexts and keys based on that in [6] , which are not used in the real system but will be used in the proof. The semi-functional ciphertexts will include elements from subgroups G p 2 and G p 3 , and the semi-functional keys will be Types 1 and 2, containing elements in G p 2 and G p 3 , respectively. When a semi-functional key of Type 1 is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, the extra elements from G p 2 in the key will be tied with the extra G p 2 elements in the ciphertext, which will cause the decryption to fail. When a semi-functional key of Type 2 is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, the extra elements from G p 3 in the key will be tied with the extra G p 3 elements in the ciphertext, which will cause the failure of the decryption. Specifically, each attribute i is assigned with two random elements z i , t i ∈ Z N , and they will be common to the semi-functional ciphertexts and keys. Note that z i , t i are fixed for each attribute i, and will not be changed for different users.
(i) Semi-functional ciphertexts. To create a semi-functional ciphertext, the encryption algorithm is run to obtain a normal ciphertext (C 0 , C 1,x , C 2,x , C 3,x ∀x). Let g 2 , g 3 be the generators of G p 2 and G p 3 , respectively. Let − → u 2 , − → u 3 ∈ Z l N be two randomly chooses vectors. For each row A x of the access matrix A, define δ x = A x · − → u 2 , σ x = A x · − → u 3 . Let B be the subset of the rows of the access matrix A whose corresponding attributes belong to the corrupt AAs. LetB be the subset of the rows of the access matrix A whose corresponding attributes are controlled by the uncorrupt AAs. Thus, the semi-functional ciphertext is formed as C 0 = C 0 ,
where γ x , ψ x ∈ Z N are randomly chosen from To create a semi-functional key of Type 2, the random oracle's outputs on GID||Time is defined to be
where c 1 ∈ Z N . Thus, a semi-functional key sk Time i,GID for an attribute i belonging to an uncorrupt AA can be generated by producing a normal key sk Time i,GID and then setting
Note that when a semi-functional key of Type 1 is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, the additional elementsê(g 2 , g 2 ) c 1 δ x prevent the decryption from succeeding, except when the values δ x are shares of 0 (i.e. it is a notionally semi-functional ciphertext). Likewise, when a semi-functional key of Type 2 is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, the additional elementsê(g 3 , g 3 ) c 1 δ x make the decryption fail.
Taking the one-use restriction on attributes throughout the proof into consideration, which means that the row labeling ρ of the challenge ciphertext access matrix (A, ρ) must be injective, we formally define the sequence of the games on the basis of that in [6] .
The first game, Game Real , is the real security game. The next game, Game Real , is similar to the real security game, except that the random oracle maps identities GID and time periods Time to the random elements of G p 1 instead of G.
Game 0 is similar to Game Real , except that the ciphertext given to the adversary is semi-functional. Let q be the number of identities GID and time periods Time for which the adversary makes the key queries sk Time i,GID . Game j,1 and Game j,2 for j ∈ [1, q] are defined as follows:
(i) Game j,1 . This is similar to Game 0 , except that for the first j − 1 queried pairs of identity and time period, the received keys are semi-functional of Type 2, and the received key for the jth queried pair of identity and time period is semi-functional of Type 1. The remaining keys are normal. (ii) Game j,2 . This is similar to Game 0 , except that for the first j queried pairs of identity and time period, the received keys are semi-functional of Type 2. The remaining keys are normal. Note that in Game q,2 , all the keys are semi-functional of Type 2.
(iii) Game Final . In this game, all the attribute-based private keys are semi-functional of Type 2, and the ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message. Note that the adversary has advantage 0 in this game.
These games are indistinguishable according to the following lemmas. Recall that the proof of security is considered under the restriction that each attribute is used at most one time in the access matrix, i.e. ρ is injective. Note that some contents of the proofs exactly follow that in [6] . Proof. Given N, g 1 , T, algorithm B chooses a hash function H 0 : {0, 1} * → Z N , and will simulate either Game Real or Game Real with algorithm A, depending on the value of T. Algorithm B outputs g 1 as the public generator of G p 1 and N as the group order. Algorithm A specifies a set S ⊆ S of the corrupt AAs for S being the set of all the AAs in the system. For each attribute i belonging to an uncorrupt AA, algorithm B randomly chooses α i , y i ∈ Z N , and sends algorithm A the public parameterê(g 1 , g 1 ) α i , g 1 y i . For the queries to the random oracle for H 1 (GID||Time) issued by algorithm A, algorithm B randomly chooses h GID,Time ∈ Z N and sets
Algorithm B stores this value so that it can respond consistently when H 1 (GID||Time) is queried again. If T is a generator of G p 1 , this value will be a random element of G p 1 . If T is a generator of G, this value will be a random element of G.
For the queries (GID, Time, i) to the key generation & update oracle from algorithm A, algorithm B extracts the corresponding private key by using the key generation & update algorithm with the known values α i and y i . Note that if GID||Time has not been issued to the random oracle yet, algorithm B sets H 1 (GID||Time) as above.
When it comes to the challenge phase, algorithm A gives algorithm B two messages M 0 , M 1 , a time period Time * and an access matrix (A, ρ), as well as the public parameter for the corrupted AAs appearing in the matrix. To create the challenge ciphertext for M β where β ∈ {0, 1} is a random bit chosen by algorithm B, algorithm B runs the encryption algorithm.
If T is a generator of G, then algorithm B has correctly simulated Game Real Let v x = A x · − → v and w x = A x · − → w . Let B denote the subset of the rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong to the corrupted AAs. LetB be the subset of the rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong to the uncorrupt AAs. For each row A x ∈ B, algorithm B randomly chooses r x ∈ Z N , and computes the ciphertext as
For each row A x ∈B, algorithm B randomly chooses r x ∈ Z N , implicitly sets r x = rr x such that g 1 r is the G p 1 part of T (T will be embedded into the calculation with shares w x ), and computes the ciphertext as
Note that the G p 1 [6] . This means that γ x , ψ x , z ρ(x) , t ρ(x) are randomly distributed, w 2 , . . . , w l of − → w are also randomly distributed modulo p 2 , p 3 , but both δ x and σ x are the shares of 0 from algorithm B's point of view. Hence, it remains to be argued that these appear to be the shares of a random exponent in the view of algorithm A.
Note that the shares δ x , σ x for the rows A x ∈ B are information-theoretically revealed to algorithm A, but the space R spanned by these rows cannot include the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) (assume that this holds modulo p 2 ). This means that there exists a vector − → u such that − → u is orthogonal to R modulo p 2 , but − → u is not orthogonal to (1, 0, . . . , 0). Fix a basis including the vector − → u , and write c − → w = − → w + a − → u for some a modulo p 2 and − → w in the span of the other basis elements. Note that − → w is uniformly distributed in this space (modulo p 2 ) and reveals no information about a (modulo p 2 ). Now, the first coordinate of c − → w modulo p 2 depends on the value of a, and the shares δ x for A x ∈ B contain no information about a (since − → u is orthogonal to R). The only information algorithm A receives about the value of a appears in the exponents of the form δ x + γ x z ρ(x) , where the z ρ ( x) is a new random value each time that appears nowhere else (recall that ρ is constrained to be injective). As long as γ x does not equal 0 modulo p 2 (γ x = 0 with only negligible probability), this means that any value of δ x can be explained by z ρ(x) taking on a particular value. Since z ρ(x) is uniformly random, this means that no information about the value of a is revealed. Hence, the value being shared is information-theoretically hidden, and the shares δ x (and similarly σ x ) are well distributed in algorithm A's view.
Thus, when T ∈ G p 1 , algorithm B correctly simulates Game Real . When T ∈ G, algorithm B properly simulates Game 0 with probability negligibly close to 1. Therefore, algorithm B can use algorithm A to obtain advantage negligibly close to in breaking Assumption 1.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.2. 
and sets
(ii) If k < j, then algorithm B randomly chooses h GID k ,Time k ∈ Z N , and sets
Note that these are random elements of G p 1 p 3 since the values of h GID k ,Time k modulo p 1 and modulo p 3 are uncorrelated). (iii) If k = j, then algorithm B randomly chooses h GID j ,Time j ∈ Z N , and then sets
In all the three cases, algorithm B stores the corresponding values in order to respond consistently when H 1 (GID k ||Time k ) is queried again.
For the queries (i, GID k , Time k ) to the key generation & update oracle from algorithm A, algorithm B responds as follows. If H 1 (GID k ||Time k ) has already been fixed, then algorithm B turns to the stored value. Otherwise, algorithm B creates H 1 (GID k ||Time k ) according to k as above. Algorithm B forms the key as sk
Notice that when k < j, algorithm B generates the semifunctional keys of Type 2 with t i being congruent to y i modulo p 3 (these are uncorrelated from the values of y i modulo p 1 which appear in the public parameter). Also, recall that the values t i are fixed for every attribute, and do not vary across different keys. When k > j, algorithm B generates the normal keys. When k = j, algorithm B generates a normal key if T ∈ G p 1 and a semi-functional key of Type 1 if T ∈ G p 1 p 2 .
For the challenge phase, algorithm A gives algorithm B two messages M 0 , M 1 , a time period Time * and an access matrix (A, ρ). In addition, algorithm A sends algorithm B the public parameter g y i ,ê(g 1 , g 1 ) α i for attributes i belonging to the corrupt AAs which are included in the access matrix (A, ρ). In order to generate a challenge ciphertext, algorithm B chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts M β as follows. Note that algorithm B will output a notionally semi-functional ciphertext, but this will be hidden from the perspective of algorithm A. First, algorithm B randomly chooses s ∈ Z N , and sets
Let algorithm B be the subset of the rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong to the corrupted AAs. LetB be the subset of the rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong to the uncorrupt AAs. For each row A x ∈ B, algorithm B randomly chooses r x ∈ Z N , and computes the ciphertext as
For each row A x ∈B, algorithm B randomly chooses ψ x , r x ∈ Z N , implicitly sets r x = rr x such that g 1 r is X 1 , and computes the ciphertext as
Note that X 1 w x is g 1 A x ·r − → w , and r − → w is a random vector with first coordinate equal to 0. This is a semi-functional ciphertext
This is a correctly generated. Note that since r x , y ρ(x) are randomly chosen in Z N , their values modulo p 1 and modulo p 2 are uncorrelated. This means that γ x , ψ x , z ρ(x) , t ρ(x) are randomly distributed. It is clear that σ x is properly distributed, since it is a share of a random vector. The entries w 2 , . . . , w l of − → w are also randomly distributed modulo p 2 , but the values of δ x are the shares of 0 from the perspective of algorithm B. It remains to be argued that these appear to be the shares of a random exponent in the view of algorithm A.
Let the space R denote the span of the rows of A whose attributes are in B and the rows whose attributes ρ(x) are queried by algorithm A with identity and time period GID j , Time j . This space cannot include the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) (assume that this modulo p 2 ), so there is some vector − → u which is orthogonal to R modulo p 2 and not orthogonal to (1, 0, . . . , 0) . Write c − → w = − → w + a − → u for some a modulo p 2 and − → w in the span of the other basis vectors. Note that − → w is uniformly distributed in this space, and reveals no information about a. The value of the first coordinate of c − → w modulo p 2 depends on the value of a, but the shares δ x for A x ∈ B contain no information Revocable and Decentralized Attribute-Based Encryption 1229 about a. The information algorithm A receives about the value of a emerges in the exponents of the form δ x + γ x z ρ(x) , where z ρ(x) is a new random value each time that has not appeared anywhere else (recall that ρ is constrained to be injective). Note that these z ρ(x) values modulo p 2 do not occur in any keys for identities and time periods not equal to GID j , Time j , since these keys are either normal or semi-functional of Type 2, they do not have components in G p 2 . As long as γ x does not equal 0 (γ x = 0 with only negligible probability), this means that any value of δ x can be explained by z ρ(x) taking on a particular value. Since z ρ(x) is uniformly random, this means that no information about the value of a modulo p 2 is revealed. Hence, the value being shared is information-theoretically hidden, and the values of δ x are properly distributed in the view of algorithm A. Though it is hidden from algorithm A, the fact that δ x can only be made to be the shares of 0 is crucial here (i.e. algorithm B can only make a notionally semi-functional ciphertext). If algorithm B attempts to test the semi-functionality of the jth key for itself by making a ciphertext the key could decrypt, decryption would succeed regardless of the presence of G p 2 components, since the δ x 's are shares of 0. Hence algorithm B would not be able to tell whether the jth key is semi-functional of Type 1 or normal.
In summary, when T ∈ G p 1 , algorithm B properly simulates Game j−1,2 . When T ∈ G p 1 p 2 , algorithm B properly simulates Game j,1 with probability negligibly close to 1. Hence, algorithm B can use algorithm A to obtain advantage negligibly close to in breaking Assumption 2.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.3. Proof. Given N, g 1 , X 1 X 3 , Y 2 Y 3 , T, algorithm B chooses a hash function H 0 : {0, 1} * → Z N , and will simulate either Game j,1 or Game j,2 with algorithm A, depending on the value of T. Algorithm B outputs g 1 as the public generator of G p 1 and N as the group order. Algorithm A specifies a set S ⊆ S of the corrupt AAs for S being the set of all the AAs in the system. For each attribute i belonging to an uncorrupt AA, algorithm B chooses random exponents α i , y i ∈ Z N , and gives algorithm A the public parameterê(g 1 , g 1 ) α i , g 1 y i . Let GID k , Time k denote the kth identity and time period queried by algorithm A. For the queries to the random oracle for H 1 (GID k ||Time k ) from algorithm A, respectively, algorithm B responds as follows:
(ii) If k < j, then algorithm B randomly chooses h GID k ,Time k ∈ Z N , and sets 
In all the three cases, algorithm B stores the corresponding values to respond consistently when 
Note that when k < j, algorithm B simulates the semifunctional keys of Type 2 for t i being congruent to y i modulo p 3 (these are uncorrelated from the values of y i modulo p 1 which appear in the public parameter). When k > j, algorithm B simulates the normal keys. When k = j, algorithm B simulates a semi-functional key of Type 1 if T ∈ G p 1 p 2 and a semi-functional key of Type 2 if T ∈ G p 1 p 3 .
For the challenge phase, algorithm A gives algorithm A two messages M 0 , M 1 , a time period Time * and an access matrix (A, ρ). Additionally, algorithm A sends algorithm B the public parameter g y i ,ê(g 1 , g 1 ) α i for attributes i belonging to the corrupt AAs which are included in the access matrix (A, ρ). Algorithm B chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts M β as follows to generate a challenge ciphertext. First, algorithm B randomly chooses s ∈ Z N , and sets
Let B denote the subset of the rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong to the corrupt AAs. LetB be the subset of the rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong to the uncorrupt AAs. For each row A x , algorithm B randomly chooses r x ∈ Z N . If row A x ∈ B, the ciphertext is computed as If row A x ∈B, the ciphertext is computed as 
T, algorithm B chooses a hash function H 0 : {0, 1} * → Z N , and will simulate either Game q,2 or Game Final with algorithm A, depending on the value of T. Algorithm B outputs g 1 as the public generator of G p 1 and N as the group order. Algorithm A specifies a set S ⊆ S of the corrupt AAs for S being the set of all the AAs in the system. For each attribute i belonging to an uncorrupt AA, algorithm B randomly chooses α i , y i ∈ Z N , and gives algorithm A the public parameterê
Note that this sets
For the queries the random oracle for H 1 (GID||Time) from algorithm A, algorithm B randomly chooses f GID,Time , h GID,Time ∈ Z N , and sets matrix (A, ρ) . Let B denote the subset of the rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong to the corrupt AAs. LetB be the subset of the rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong to the uncorrupt AAs. Algorithm B chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts M β as follows.
Algorithm B computes C 0 = M β · T with the setting s = abc. If T =ê(g 1 , g 1 ) abc , this will be an encryption of M β . If T is random, this will be an encryption of a random message.
Algorithm B chooses a random vector − → u 1 ∈ Z l N , of which the first entry is 1 and − → u 1 is orthogonal to all the rows in B (such a vector is assumed to be of existence, since otherwise the access matrix is illegal or a non-trivial factor of N can be found, violating the complexity assumptions). Algorithm B also chooses a vector − → u 2 ∈ Z l N , of which the first entry is 0 and the rest are randomly chosen. Define the vector − → v = abc − → u 1 + − → u 2 (note that this vector is uniformly random from algorithm A's view).
where r x is randomly chosen from Z N . Then
Thus, algorithm B can compute C 1,x for A x ∈B as
For the rows A x ∈ B, algorithm B randomly chooses r x ∈ Z N , and computes Note that v x = A x · − → u 2 for these rows because − → u 1 is orthogonal to A x . For the rows A x ∈B, algorithm B randomly chooses γ x ∈ Z N , and computes C 2,x as
Note that the values of γ x modulo p 2 and p 3 are uncorrelated, so this is correctly generated. For the rows A x ∈ B, algorithm B can simply compute C 2,x = g 1 r x . Algorithm B now randomly chooses a vector − → w with the first entry equal to 0 and the other entries randomly chosen from Z N , and a random vector − → u 3 whose entries are all randomly chosen from Z N . Let w x = A x · − → w and δ x = A x · − → u 3 . For the rows A x ∈ B, since
This is consistent with t ρ(x) being congruent to y ρ ( x) modulo p 3 in the keys. Note that the sharing vector in subgroups G p 2 and G p 3 is −d − → u 1 + − → u 3 , which is random modulo p 2 and modulo p 3 . For the rows A x ∈ B, algorithm B computes C 3,x as
The sharing vector is consistent here because − → u 1 is orthogonal to all of these rows A x . This is a correctly generated semi-functional ciphertext with s = abc. If T =ê(g 1 , g 1 ) abc , this is a semi-functional encryption of M β , and algorithm B has simulated Game q,2 . If T is random, this is a semi-functional encryption of a random message, and algorithm B has simulated Game Final . Hence, algorithm B can use algorithm A to obtain advantage in breaking Assumption 4.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.5.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we make a comparison among some revocable ABE schemes, and then show some interesting extensions to our revocable and decentralized ABE system.
Comparisons
As far as we know, besides the work in this paper, Refs [7, 8, 18] are also about ABE systems supporting indirect revocation. These systems manage to solve revocation problem from different point of views. This paper aims to achieve indirect revocation in a decentralized CP-ABE system such that the AAs can indirectly accomplish revocation by stopping updating the keys for the revoked users. In [7] , a revocable KP-ABE scheme is proposed using indirect revocation where the AA enables the revocation by forcing the revoked users to be unable to update their keys. In [8] , a hybrid revocable KP-ABE system is raised under selective security model which allows a sender to select whether to use either direct or indirect revocation mode when encrypting a message. In [18] , the first revocable ABE scheme is provided in a generic way that deals with the problem of efficiently revoking stored data, where the database can periodically update the ciphertexts using only publicly available information stored on the system. Compared with other ABE schemes supporting indirect revocation, the major advantage of our system is that there are no prefixed values on the numbers of users, revoked users, attributes and time periods allowed for the system. In Table 1 , we compare the scalability of our system with those KP-ABE or CP-ABE schemes under indirect revocation in [7, 8, 18] , in which 'preset' means that the value is confirmed during the setup phase of the system. Let m be the maximum number of attributes allowed for the system, t be the maximum number of time periods allowed for the system, d be the maximum number of attributes allowed to be revoked for the system. From Table 1 , it is not difficult to see that our construction has an edge in achieving scalability among indirectly revocable ABE schemes, because an attribute can be freely added or revoked at any time without affecting the execution of the system.
In Table 2 , we compare the efficiency of our system with the revocable ABE schemes in [7, 8, 18] and the basic scheme of our system [6] , where the values corresponding to the first two and the next three schemes show the number of group elements in G p and G N , respectively, and the symbol-denotes not-applicable. Denote by |sk|, |ct|, |uk|, |pk| the size of user [7] 2l log(n) + 1 k + 2 2 r log n r + r m + 3 KP in [8] 2(l + 1) log(n) k + 3 2 r log n r + r m + 3 KP in [18] 2ln k + 2 -m + 4 CP in [18] 2(k + 2)n 2(l + 1) -m + 4 CP in [6] private key, ciphertext overhead, user update key and fixed system public key, respectively. Let r be the number of the revoked users, n be the number of all the users, l be the size of the number of the attributes presented in the access structure, k be the size of the attribute set, m be the maximum size allowed for k. According to Table 2 , we can see that our system performs better in alleviating AA's computation consumption than other revocable systems when l > n/2, r > n/5, yet accomplishes the same efficiency of the original decentralized ABE scheme without revocation in [6] .
Extension to logarithmic size of key updates
In our previous scheme, each AA works linearly in the number of users, so it could be desirable to find countermeasures to ameliorate it. We can simply employ to the above scheme the complete-subtree method [21] to reduce the size of key updates from linear to logarithmic in the number of users [7, 8, 18] .
To begin with, we recall the node selection algorithm KUNodes introduced in [7] , which computes the minimal set of nodes for which key update needs to be published so that only nonrevoked users at each time period are able to decrypt the ciphertexts. In our new scheme, each AA will be assigned a binary tree BT i . Let BT i be a binary tree with N leaves corresponding to N users. Denote root i by the root node of the tree BT i . If L is a leaf node then Path(L) denotes the set of nodes on the path from L to root i , including both L and root i . If L is a non-leaf node, then L l , L r denote left and right child of L. The algorithm KUNodes takes the binary tree BT i , the revocation list rl i and a revocation time period Time as input, it marks all the ancestors of revoked nodes as revoked, and then outputs all the non-revoked children of revoked nodes. Refer to [7] for a pictorial depiction and details of the formal definition about KUNodes. Below we give the algorithms of our new construction, which mostly follow that in the previous scheme except that the KeyGen & KeyUpdate algorithm in the prior construction will be replaced by three algorithms.
KUNodes(BT
(i) GSetup. The same as in the previous construction.
(ii) ASetup. The same as in the previous construction. (iii) Private key generation. This algorithm chooses an unassigned leaf note L from BT and store GID in this node.
For each node τ ∈ Path(L), if it is undefined, it chooses a i,τ ∈ Z N , stores a i,τ in the node τ . Otherwise, it fetches the stored a i,τ , and computes
